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1 Introduction
The issue of international labour standards continues to figure prominently both
in public and academic debate. Trade theorists have analysed their economic
effects in a number of recent papers. Less research, however, has been done on
the institutions by which international labour standards are actually adopted. In
particular, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations
agency which deals specifically with such standards, has rarely been studied
from the point of view of positive political economy.
In this paper, we look at a central part of the ILO’s standard-setting
process. In order to become legally binding on member states, ILO conventions
must be ratified by the national legislative authorities. Our question is to the
circumstances which induce countries to ratify ILO conventions.
Ratification is entirely voluntary, no sanctions are provided against
countries which do not ratify conventions, and there is usually no time limit set
for ratification. Moreover, even if a country has ratified a convention, the ILO
cannot enforce, by economic sanctions or other coercive measures, the
compliance with the standard. These facts cast some doubt over the
effectiveness of ILO standard-setting.1 Recent empirical studies, however, have
found that the ratification of ILO conventions has a positive and significant
impact on labour costs (Rodrik, 1996) and social spending (Strang and Chang,
1993). Like with any econometric study used for evaluative purposes, the
approach taken in these articles rests on strong assumptions since it involves a
comparison of an actual situation with a counterfactual. Constructing this
counterfactual is problematic if – as is common to cross-country studies – the
degree of heterogeneity that cannot be observed by the researcher is large. Yet
the findings of these studies  appear to be supported by the available descriptive
                                          
1 Thus Bhagwati (1995: 754) concludes that “many [ILO conventions] have been
signed because in effect they are not binding”.
evidence. In a recent study, the OECD (1996: 15) judged the ILO’s monitoring
system to be “reasonably effective, within its limits of application”. Concerning
ratification, country reports published regularly in the International Labour
Review2 suggest that ILO conventions do have an influence on the domestic
process of political decision-making.
Although a conclusive answer is not possible at this stage, it appears that
ratifications frequently result in amendments of existing national law. The
ratification decision should thus be seen as more than a merely symbolic act,
although it is equally clear that the effectiveness of ILO standard-setting cannot
be judged from ratification numbers alone.
An early study of ratification behaviour was written by Ernst B. Haas
(1962). He examined the average number of ratifications within country groups
defined by their political and economic system and their economic development.
According to his tabulations, communist states and emerging economies had the
highest frequency of ratification. A further distinction was made between
convention subjects.
While Haas gave descriptive evidence only and performed no statistical
tests, Senti (1998) recently estimated an econometric model of ratification. In
contrast to Haas, Senti looks only at industrialised countries. His independent
variables are economic variables (income and openness) and a number of
political indexes. He does not detect a significant impact of the economic
variables. However, this negative finding could well be due to his inefficient
estimation method. In order to be able to perform a linear regression on a
continuous dependent variable, Senti averages the ratification numbers over
five-year intervals.
The estimations done for this paper are based on a rational actor model of
the ratification decision. These decisions are dealt with on an individual basis.
                                          
2 In the series “The contribution of international labour standards to national labour
law“.
An important characteristic of the data is that ratifications of conventions
adopted many years before are a frequent phenomenon. Hence the variable to be
explained is not only ratification itself, but also the duration up to ratification.
This suggests the use of hazard rate models. These models were originally used
in biostatistics, and have frequently been applied in economics. There have also
been some successful applications to political research. Particularly interesting is
the example concerning the adoption of European Commission legislative
initiatives by the European Council of Ministers (see Golub, 1999, and König
and Schultz, 1994).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first introduce the
legal framework for ILO labour standards. In the section that follows, three
broad hypotheses concerning ratification behaviour are formulated. Next, we
derive the empirical model and discuss the independent variables used. Section
five introduces the dataset and the estimation technique, and the sixth section
contains the empirical results.
2 The institutional framework
The adoption and supervision of international labour standards 3 has been the
most important task of the ILO ever since its foundation in 1919. The ILO
adopts, at the annual International Labour Conference, two kinds of standards:
conventions and recommendations. Only conventions can be ratified and thus
become legally binding on member states. Recommendations are most
frequently used to supplement conventions, either giving more detail on the
contents of the standard or sometimes setting a higher standard than the
Convention.
The International Labour Conference is a quasi-parliamentarian entity
with a strongly formalised decision procedure. It adopts labour standards by a
                                          
3 A more detailed account of the institutions is given in Boockmann (2000).
majority of two thirds of the delegates. A peculiar feature is the tripartite
composition of the Conference. Each member state sends four delegates to the
Conference: two from the government 4, and one each from the trade unions and
the employers’ organisations. The latter two delegates are appointed by the
government, but the ILO Constitution requires the appointment to be made “in
agreement with the industrial organisations, if such organisations exist, which
are most representative of employers or workpeople” (Article 3,5). It further
provides that “every delegate shall be entitled to vote individually on all matters
which are taken into consideration by the Conference” (Article 4,1), giving
union and employer delegates the right to vote independently of their
governments’ views.
ILO conventions cover many areas of labour legislation, social regulation
and social security systems. Table 1 provides a breakdown of ILO conventions
by subject category, using the ILO’s own classification system.
In the left part of the table, all conventions adopted between 1919 and
1997 are listed, while the right part contains only those conventions that are used
in the estimation subsample (see section 5). Working conditions, including
health and safety issues, form the largest single subject area for international
labour standards. Other areas where a large number of standards have been
adopted are basic human rights (mainly dealing with the right of association,
non-discrimination and forced labour), social security and child work (although
in the latter two categories, there has been little activity during the 1975-95
period). Many conventions affect only certain occupations or sectors. In
particular, seafarers’ conventions have a special status because they are adopted
at separate ILO maritime conferences.
                                          
4  Most often from the labour department but sometimes also from the foreign
department, as can be seen from the lists of delegates published in the Records of
Proceedings of the International Labour Conference.
Table 1. Number of Conventions by subject category
Subject categories 1919-97 1975-95
Basic human rights 11 (0.06) 3 (0.08)
Employment 9 (0.05) 3 (0.08)
Social policy 1 (0.01) 0 (0.00)
Labour administration 6 (0.03) 3 (0.08)
Industrial relations 1 (0.01) 1 (0.03)
Conditions of work 47 (0.25) 13 (0.36)
among  these, occupational
safety   and health standards
20 (0.11) 9 (0.25)
Social security 21 (0.12) 1 (0.03)
Employment of women 6 (0.03) 0 (0.00)
Employment of children and
young persons
13 (0.07) 0 (0.00)
Migrant workers 5 (0.02) 2 (0.06)
Indigenous and tribal peoples 6 (0.03) 0 (0.00)
Other special categories
(seafarers, older workers,
fishermen etc. )
53 (0.30) 10 (0.28)
Other subjects 2 (0.01) 1 (0.02)
All subjects 181 (1.00) 36 (1.00)
Note: Numbers in brackets are percentage shares. These may
not sum to 1.00 due to rounding errors.
Once a labour standard is adopted, it is the obligation of the member
states to submit it to the legislative authority within 12 months. 5 As already
mentioned, ratification itself is voluntary, although the ILO has made the
ratification by all member states of seven “fundamental human rights
                                          
5 See the ILO „Handbook of Procedures relating to international labour Conventions
and Recommendations“, Part II, paragraph 12. For federal states where the
responsibility for labour regulation lies at the regional level, this limit is 18 months
(Handbook of Procedures, Part II; paragraph 7.
conventions” a primary target of its political activities. 6 Conventions can only
be ratified in full; amendments at the national stage are not admissible. 7 If a
convention is ratified, the member state must make effective the provisions
specified in it. In many cases, this means that national labour law must be
revised or new legislation must be introduced. In some countries, with
ratification, the convention becomes directly binding on workers and employers;
in others, separate legal measures have to be taken. 8
Following ratification, the most direct obligation which arises for a
member state is to report in regular intervals on the application of the
convention in legislation and practice. These reports are the principal
information sources for the supervisory system of the ILO. There is also a
procedure whereby governments, unions or employer associations can submit
complaints to the ILO if they believe that a country does not comply with its
obligations from the ratification of a convention. If a discrepancy is found
between the provisions of a ratified convention and the situation in a member
state, this is made public and a negotiation process sets in between the country
and the tripartite Conference committee on the application of standards. Since
there are no formal sanctions, the worst which countries have to fear is a loss of
international reputation.
Member states may denounce conventions which they had previously
ratified. However, a denunciation is possible only at certain times, stipulated in
the texts of the conventions themselves (usually during one year within a ten-
year interval). The vast majority of denunciations take place in the context of the
revision of conventions. In the estimation sample, there are no conventions
                                          
6 Bartolomei de la Cruz et al. (1996: 129).
7 However, some conventions allow for a certain degree of flexibility, e.g. offering
countries different ways of implementing standards.
8 For an extensive discussion of the direct or indirect application of ILO conventions,
see Leary (1982).
which were revised, and there was only one individual denunciation. 9 Hence we
neglect this issue in the following.
3 Three hypotheses on ratification behaviour
The starting point for a rational choice theory of ratification behaviour must be
the consequences of formally signing up to a convention. Does ratification
actually restrict future decisions on labour legislation, or is it only a weak
commitment which can be abandoned if this is in the interest of national actors?
The question of compliance arises not only for ILO conventions, but in a similar
way for international environmental standards, human rights standards, or
maritime conventions.
In the political science literature, opinions differ vastly on the degree of
compliance with international agreements. On one side, there is the traditional
“realist” view that states keep their promises only as long as it is in their narrow
self-interest. At the other extreme, Chayes and Chayes (1993) argue that, rather
than calculating the costs and benefits of a defection, states “operate under a
sense of obligation to conform their conduct to governing norms”.
A theoretical treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, we take it for granted that ratification creates a legal obligation to
introduce or maintain the international standard. We assume that breaches of this
obligation are made public by the ILO’s supervisory procedures and entail a loss
of international standing. If the responsible political actors aim to maintain their
reputation, they will be more inclined to ratify conventions which can
subsequently be implemented. Therefore, conventions are ceteris paribus the
more likely to be ratified the easier their implementation can be accomplished. If
these assumptions are true, the following hypothesis should also hold:
                                          
9 Brazil denounced Convention No. 158 in 1995.
Hypothesis 1: Countries are more prepared to ratify conventions that entail
lower economic and administrative costs.
Economic costs are welfare losses of domestic actors from higher non-
wage labour costs. In a general equilibrium model with full employment in all
countries, labour or social regulation may be conceptualised as an additional
good in individuals’ utility functions, while at the same time changing the
production possibility frontier of the country. An international minimum
standard will either be non-binding (if optimal domestic “consumption” of the
regulation is already above the international standard) or cause a level of
regulation that is higher than the Pareto optimal level (Srinivasan, 1997).10  In
the presence of labour markets imperfections, the introduction of new regulation
is also likely to result in welfare losses in the form of higher unemployment.
Introducing legislation and cooperating in the ILO’s reporting system may
also place a heavy workload on a country’s bureaucracy and may therefore be
avoided.11 This will be especially true for small countries with few
administrative staff and for developing countries. There is evidence that the
administrative burden is sometimes important even for large industrialised
countries.12
Within each country, costs and benefits from ratification will fall
differently on individuals. Since no country can be forced to ratify conventions,
the interests of domestic political actors (such as voters, parliamentarians or
interest groups) and the rules of the domestic political game ultimately decide
over ratification. ILO conventions will, however, only have an impact on
domestic political debate if they affect the political constraints under which
                                          
10 If, however, implementation of the international standard is linked to transfer
payments, the standard may be constrained Pareto optimal (Srinivasan, 1997).
11 Unless the bureaucracy values more work positively, as in Niskanen’s (1971)
model.
12 See Haase (1990: 241).
actors operate, e.g., the re-election constraint.13 If the political constraints were
unchanged, the actors favouring ratification could just as well campaign for a
purely domestic standard. There are three mechanisms by which the existence of
a convention can impact on the political constraints.
– By the obligation to submit conventions to the legislative authority,
gatekeeping rights of certain domestic actors (i.e., veto rights concerning
the issues to be brought before the legislative assembly) may be
abolished.
– If there are direct benefits to a country from ratification (such as an
increase in international standing), this opens a new policy dimension. As
a consequence, an existing political equilibrium in the relevant area of
regulation may be overturned.14
– International conventions may serve as cooperative devices for interest
groups on which to centre their political demands. If there are increasing
returns to scale from lobbying, a pooling of political resources may be
worthwhile. In such a situation, an international standard may be a natural
focal point on which to coordinate political strategies.
As a result, one can state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A ratification takes place if (a) it is in the regulatory interest of a
winning coalition of domestic political actors and (b) the existence of a
convention changes the political game such that this regulatory interest can be
better served by ratification than by a purely domestic regulation.
                                          
13 This, of course, is the essence of the public choice theory of international
organisation. In the words of one of its main proponents, a national politician „will
not participate in international decision-making, unless, by doing so, he can obtain
an agreement which (A) satisfies him personally; or (B) helps him to gain votes; or
(C) reduces his cost, in terms of votes lost, of implementing his own favoured
domestic policies” (Vaubel 1986: 42f.).
14 This argument bears some analytical resemblance to the introduction of “non-policy
issues” in the election model of Enelow and Hinich (1984).
Despite the voluntary character of ratification, there may exist various
ways in which pressure for ratification can be exerted from abroad, of which
moral suasion may be only the most publicly perceptible one. While there is no
evidence for any institutional links, development aid may be donated with an
implicit understanding that the recepient country improves workers’ rights or
working conditions. The same may be true for the granting of credits, both by
individual countries and multilateral agencies like the World Bank. It is also
conceivable that ratifications of ILO conventions play a role in trade
negotiations, although, again, no formal link exists.
Hypothesis 3: Pressure from abroad may impact on the ratification decision.
Most vulnerable to this pressure are countries which receive transfers or
subsidised credits from abroad and comparatively open economies.
4 Empirical specification and variables used in estimation
The dependent variable in our estimations will be the likelihood of ratification at
each point of time. Since the data give the days at which a convention was
ratified, time will be modelled continuously rather than as a sequence of discrete
intervals. The model explains the limit of the probability of a ratification,
conditional on the ratification not being made up to the particular point of time,
when the time interval in question becomes arbitrarily small. This limit is called
the hazard rate:
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where t indexes time and T is the ratification date. In the following, the
proportional hazard model of Cox (1975) will be applied:
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The hazard rate is composed of two parts. The second part contains, for
each observation, a 1×k  vector of observed determinants of ratification
(including a constant), z, and a 1×k  parameter vector γ common to all
observations. The function ψ will be assumed to be exponential such that the
hazard cannot become negative. The first component is the baseline hazard
which depends only on the time elapsed since the adoption of the convention.
This part of the hazard rate captures duration dependence. It is assumed that the
duration dependence is independent of any of the covariates.
There are a number of reasons why, in our context, duration dependence
will arise. The first is that the pressure on a country to ratify a convention can
increase over time. This seems particularly likely in the case of „human rights“
conventions.15 On the other hand, conventions may lose their relevance over
time and even become obsolete, so that very few new ratifications are to be
expected. The baseline hazard also captures the increased likelihood of
ratification due to the obligatory submission of the convention in the 12 or 18
months following its adoption. Since there are reasons both for a rising and a
falling baseline hazard, the functional form for this hazard should be flexible
enough to allow for non-monotonicity.
The z variables relate to the economic and administrative costs of
ratification, as well as to political pressure from domestic, foreign or
international actors. Table 2 shows the covariates used in the estimations
together with the data sources used.
Economic costs are measured by a first group of variables. Per capita
income enters both linearly and quadratically. The other two variables in this
category are dummy variables which indicate whether the convention is a
revision of an earlier one, and whether the country had ratified this
“predecessor” convention.16 The ratification of a “predecessor” convention
                                          
15 „A state is subjected to a good deal of direct, intensive and recurrent pressure to
ratify. The Organization proceeds by a process of attrition, directed at wearing down
the resistance of states“ (McMahon 1966:185).
16 The final articles of each convention state whether the convention revises and
updates a previous one.
should enhance the likelihood of ratification of the revising convention because
the national status quo is likely to be closer to the provisions of the new
convention.
Table 2. Variables used in estimation
Variable used in estimation Hypothesis Data Source
Real GDP per Capita 1 (Costs) World Bank (1999)
Existence of Predecessor Convention,
Dummy
1 (Costs) ILOLEX database
Ratification of Predecessor
Convention
1 (Costs) ILOLEX database
Democracy, Dummy 2 (Internal Pressure) Alvarez et al. (1996)
Left Majority in Parliament, Dummy
(interacted with Democracy Dummy)
2 (Internal Pressure) Gorvin (1989), political
science webpages, and
Parliaments’ websites
Voting at the International Labour
Conference by Government, Union
and Employer Delegates
2 (Internal Pressure) ILC Record of
Proceedings
Development Aid, Percent of GDP 3 (External Pressure) World Bank (1999)
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, Percent
of GDP
3 (External Pressure) World Bank (1999)
IMF Credits 3 (External Pressure) World Bank (1999)
Population 1 (Costs) World Bank (1999)
Openness 3 (External Pressure),
1 (Costs)
World Bank (1999)
Hypothesis 2 (internal pressure) is represented by the next three variables or
groups of variables. There is, first, a dummy variable for democracies, taken
from Alvarez et al. (1996).17 In a democracy, delegates to the legislative
                                          
17 These authors classify 152 countries into the following regime types: autocracies,
bureaucracies, presidentialism and  parliamentarianism. For our purposes, the
former two and the latter two categories are merged to „dictatorships“ and
„democracies“. Furthermore, we had to extend the end of the observation period
from 1990 to 1995, using the criteria given in Alvarez et al. The following countries
from the sample of Alvarez et al. changed their classification from „dictatorships“
assembly are more likely to represent population groups whose working
conditions are positively affected by the standard than in an oligarchy, hence we
expect a positive sign. Diverging preferences between political parties in
democracies are captured by a left-right dummy. Since conventions must be
ratified by the legislative authority, this variable refers to parliamentarian
majorities. It is set equal to one if a socialist or a social-democratic party or a
coalition in which such a party is the dominant partner commands an absolute
majority in the lower house of parliament.18
A further set of independent variables more directly measures the
preferences of the main actors in labour market regulation, i.e., governments,
unions and employers. Our measure rests on voting behaviour of the delegates to
the International Labour Conference at the final roll-call vote on the convention
in question. If, for example, the employer delegate of country i voted in favour
of the convention, the dummy variable which indicates employers’ consent is set
to one. If he or she voted against or formally abstained, the dummy variable
indicating employers’ opposition is set to one. The base group is the case that
the delegate did not participate in voting. Union and government preferences are
measured in the same way; however, the “no”-Dummy is omitted for unions
because it hardly ever happens that a union delegate votes against a convention,
or openly abstains.19
Concerning external pressure (hypothesis 3), we use variables which
relate to the potential rather than actual pressure from abroad. Potential pressure
                                                                                                                                   
to „democracies“ after 1990: Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Paraguay, Poland and South Africa. The democratisation of most of Eastern Europe
is already noted in Alvarez et al.
18 For the classification of parties, Wilfried Derksen’s website „International directory
of parties“, was used (URL: http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/parties.htm).
19 Since every country sends two government delegates to the conference, the dummy
variables were coded as follows: „yes“—both government delegates in favour or
one government delegate in favour, the other not present; „no“—both government
consists in the possibility of withdrawal of aid or credits or the vulnerability of a
country with respect to trade sanctions. The variables used are development aid,
World Bank credits or IMF lending (all of them as per cent of GDP) and the
standard openness measure (imports plus exports as per cent of GDP). In the aid
variable, both bilateral and multilateral programmes are included. With the
World Bank and the IMF variables, we also check whether there is a link
between these United Nations agencies and ILO policies. Potentially, the
coefficients of these variables suffer from an endogeneity problem. Only if
external pressure remains a threat and is not actually exerted, is the level of aid
and credits exogenous to the ratification decision. If, on the other hand,
countries are actually rewarded or punished, these variables are endogenous.
A different problem arises for the openness variable. Apart from
measuring the degree to which countries can potentially be punished by trade
sanctions, this variable also reflects the economic costs of ratification, since
relatively closed economies need to worry less about their level of labour costs
than open economies. The expectation for the sign of the coefficient differs
between these two interpretations: according to the pressure hypothesis, more
open economies should ratify more conventions, while according to the cost
hypothesis, they should ratify less.
We also include total population numbers. Since the administrative costs
of ratifying a convention are largely fixed, there may be economies of scale. In
that case, a positive impact of country size on the ratification probability is
expected.
To reduce the vast heterogeneity of behaviour across countries, separate
estimations are performed for groups of countries. We categorise countries into
three groups: industrialised democracies, Eastern bloc countries, and all other
                                                                                                                                   
delegates against / abstained or one government delegate against / abstained, the
other not present
countries.20 For want of a better expression, we will refer to the last group as
“developing countries”. Since the number of countries is small in the Eastern
bloc group and data are available only up to 1989, we estimate ratification
hazard rates only for the other two groups. In the estimation subsample, the
number of industrialised countries is 22 and the number of developing countries
is 86.
A group of subject dummy variables is defined along the classification
scheme seen from table 1. Finally, calendar time enters as an independent
variable to assess possible changes in ratification behaviour over time.
5 Data and estimation procedure
5.1 Sample definition and descriptive evidence
The data set used in the estimations has three dimensions. What is to be
explained is the ratification or otherwise by country i of convention j at time t.
In line with econometric terminology, we will describe ratifications as
transitions between two states (from not yet having ratified the convention to
having ratified it). The period of time during which ratification is an option to
the country is called a duration or a ratification spell. We neglect the decision to
denounce a convention because, as mentioned in section 2, denunciation is a
very rare event. The state of having ratified a convention is thus viewed as an
absorbing state.
In duration data analysis, different sampling schemes can be used with a
number of implications for the estimation methods (see Lancaster, 1990, chapter
                                          
20 Industrialised democracies are the founding members of the OECD, together with
Japan, Finland and New Zealand, but excluding Turkey (Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.A). The Eastern bloc countries
are Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union, while
8). An important distinction is between stock data and flow data. In stock data,
one observes, at a fixed calendar date, a number of observation units which are
at risk of making a transition. A drawback of this scheme is that units with a low
risk of transition are over-sampled. In flow data, by contrast, units are observed
from the moment at which they become at risk. We follow this principle,
including only countries for which we have full covariate information over the
whole period since adoption.
Availability of information on the covariates limits the period of
observation to the years 1975 to 1995. Given the sampling scheme, this means
that only ratifications of conventions adopted in this interval can be included in
the dataset. These are conventions 141 to 176. We exclude all conventions
adopted by the special maritime conference because this sector is, due to its
international nature, believed to be fundamentally different from the scope of the
other conventions. This results in a loss of a further seven conventions, bringing
the number of conventions in the dataset to 29. For a distribution of the subject
categories of these conventions, see the right column in table 1 above.
In the 1975-95 interval, there have been 635 ratifications on these 29
conventions. This means that of the 163 ILO member states of 1995, each had
ratified, on average, 3.9 conventions from this group during the observation
period. There are, however, huge differences in ratification behaviour. Table 3
shows the distribution of ratification numbers across countries. A relative
majority of the countries had not ratified a single convention adopted within the
observation period. However, many of these countries had joined the ILO only
in the 1990s. At the top of the table, 13 countries had adopted more than a dozen
conventions. The list is headed by Sweden, which had ratified 22 conventions,
followed by Norway (19), Finland and Spain (18), Mexico, Uruguay and Cyprus
(14), and Brasil (13).
                                                                                                                                   
data on former Czechoslovakia and East Germany could not be obtained. For the
years after 1989, Eastern bloc countries are re-classified as developing countries.
Table 3. Frequencies of ratification
(Conventions C141-C176)
Number of ratifications
(1975-1995)
Number of countries
more than 12 8
11-12 4
9-10 13
7-8 9
5-6 23
3-4 23
1-2 38
0 45
635 163
To obtain a measure of the probability of ratification, we use the Kaplan-
Meier survivor function estimate. In our case, the survivor function is defined as
the probability of not having ratified a certain convention t days after its
adoption, where t is a running index of time. In our figures, we will depict the
failure function, which is simply one minus the survivor function. It gives the
probability of ratification up to date t. 21
In order to obtain meaningful results in duration analysis, we have to
reduce our sample of ratifications slightly. If a country enters the ILO after the
adoption of the convention in question, the ratification spell starts with a
different event. Since it is unlikely that the stochastic processes are the same for
both starting events, we exclude all countries for the ratification of a particular
                                          
21 Formally, the Kaplan-Meier estimator of ratification is given as
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where nj is the number of countries not having ratified up to time tj = t and rj is the
number of ratifications which the convention receives at time tj; see Kalbfleisch and
Prentice (1980: 12).
convention which have not been members at the date of its adoption. For the
same reason, if a country has not been a member over the whole period in which
the convention was open to ratification, it is eliminated from the dataset for
those conventions which have been adopted prior to its most recent re-entry. 22
Likewise, data on countries which were split up or united are excluded for
conventions adopted prior to the territorial change.23 This leaves us with a data
set of 4024 ratifications spells, of  which 508 or 12.6 per cent were uncensored,
i.e. ended with a ratifications. 24
Figure 1 shows the cumulated ratification probabilities for all
conventions, separately for industrialised democracies and developing countries.
On the vertical axis, we measure the probability of ratification. On the horizontal
axis, we measure time in days after ratification.
The ratification function differs significantly between the two country
groups.25 At all durations after adoption, the probability of having ratified a
convention is much higher for industrialised countries. The shape of the Kaplan-
Meier failure function differs, too. For industrialised countries, it is clearly
concave. This means that the hazard (i.e., the probability of ratification at any
particular moment, given non-ratification up to that moment) is declining. For
developing countries, the failure function is almost linear and even becomes
slightly convex at long durations. Hence, these countries do not only ratify fewer
conventions than industrialised countries, but on average, they also do so later.
                                          
22 We make an exception, however, for countries with short absences (up to five
years) from the ILO, like the U.S. which left the ILO from 1977 to 1980.
23 This concerns Czechoslovakia, Germany, the Soviet Union, Yemen, and
Yugoslavia. Other territorial changes have not been accounted for.
24 In the estimations, the data set is further reduced to 2958 spells and 414
ratifications, thus 14 per cent of all spells were uncensored in the estimation
sample. The loss of observations is due to the lack of covariate information for
certain countries and to the exclusion of Eastern bloc countries.
25 A logrank test yielded a test statistic of 231.79 (critical value for 5 per cent
significance: 5.99)
Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier estimates of the cumulated probability of ratification
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Overall, the probability of having ratified a convention after 10 years is 31.4 per
cent for industrialised countries, 9.6 per cent for developing countries and 12.6
per cent for all countries taken together, including Eastern bloc countries.
In figure 2, we display the standard life table estimator of the ratification
hazard. It is calculated as the number of ratifications in interval t over the
number of countries at risk during interval t, adjusted for cases of censoring and
divided by interval length (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980: 15).26 Vertical lines
give standard deviations.
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with mj as the number of censorings during interval j and tj the starting date of the
interval.
Figure 2. Life table estimates of the empirical hazard of ratification
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Starting from the date of adoption, there is a marked decline in the
ratification probabilities over time for industrialised countries. The  hazard peaks
in the second year from adoption, which could be explained by the obligatory
submission of conventions to the legislative assemblies. However, one needs to
be extremely careful interpreting the graph because the shape of the hazard
function could also be produced by calendar time effects. A decline in the
probability of ratification over calendar time would manifest itself in a falling
hazard estimate because observations at long durations are available only from
later years, while observations for the first years after adoption are obtained
from all years of the observation period. For developing countries, we observe a
much lower hazard. A striking difference is that, as was expected from the
Kaplan-Meier plot, the hazard does not decline over the duration. The empirical
hazard peaks at 18 years after adoption; however, the number of observations is
very small at this duration, which is reflected in the large standard deviations.
Table 4 displays sample means and standard deviations for the  covariates
used in estimation, separately for industrialised and developing countries.
5.2 Estimation method
Since the focus of our attention is on the covariate influence, we do not specify
the complete distribution of the ratification spells but use Cox’s (1975) partial
likelihood approach. In the proportional hazard model, the total likelihood can
be decomposed into two multiplicatively connected parts. The maximisation of
one of them, based on the observed ordering of the transitions in the dataset,
yields consistent parameter estimates.27
                                          
27 Lancaster (1990: 233 ff).
Table 4. Sample means and standard deviations
Industrialised
democracies
Other countries
(except Eastern bloc)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Real GDP per Capita (in 1985 US-$) 13132.01 3027.46 3196.17 3685.15
Existence of Predecessor Convention,
Dummy
0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44
Ratification of Predecessor Convention 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.18
Democracy, Dummy 1.00 0.04 0.30 0.46
Left Majority in Parliament, Dummy 0.16 0.37 0.06 0.24
Union delegate voting yes 0.91 0.28 0.60 0.49
Union delegate voting noa 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.08
Employer delegate voting yes 0.57 0.50 0.43 0.50
Employer delegate voting noa 0.35 0.48 0.14 0.35
Government delegates voting yes 0.85 0.36 0.54 0.50
Government delegates voting noa 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22
Development Aid, Percent of GDP — — 8.62 13.27
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, Percent of
GDP (interacted with non-industrialised)
— — 3.41 3.17
IMF Credits — — 1.21 1.94
Population (millions) 37.03 60.89 35.15 132.73
Openness: (exports + imports) / GDP 69.87 41.39 72.17 51.10
a “No” votes are votes against plus declared abstentions, as defined in the text. One minus the
proportion of “yes” votes minus the proportion of “no” votes gives the proportion of undeclared
abstentions.
A complication of the estimation problem is the presence of country-
specific unobservable effects. In the following, we compare three different
estimators. The first is the standard Cox estimator which does not allow for
country-specific effects. The second is a Cox estimator which specifies, for each
country, a country-specific effect multiplied with the common baseline  hazard.
These country-specific effects are then parametrically estimated using dummy
variables. The third estimator is even more flexible, allowing for an arbitrary
country-specific baseline hazard. It is referred to as the stratified Cox model.
The standard Cox model
Let us assume for the moment that all conventions are ultimately ratified by all
countries, i.e. there is no right-censoring. Roughly stated, the Cox estimator
maximises, over all points of time at which an exit is observed, the probability
of exit of the individual that actually leaves at that time, given that any
individual exits at that time and given the number of exits up to that time. Some
discussion of the concept of time used is necessary at this point. Let us denote  tij
as the time which has elapsed after the adoption of convention j up to its
ratification by country i, where Ii ,...,1=  and iJj ,...,1= , with Ji the number of
conventions which can be ratified by country i.28 In other words, tij is not
calendar time but the duration from the start of the ratification spell.
To arrive at the desired probability measure, the concept of the  risk set is
needed. We will define kijR  as the set of conventions not ratified by country k at
the instant before tij; our notion of the risk set is thus country-specific. Let  l be a
convention from this set.
Using equation (1), country i’s hazard rate for ratifying convention j at
time tij is
])'(exp[)()( 0 γλ=λ ijijijijij tztt .
Conditioning on the fact that some country ratifies a convention from its risk set
at duration tij, we obtain the likelihood contribution for country  i and
convention j at time tij:
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28 Recall that, due to the sampling scheme, we discard information for conventions
adopted prior to the accession of a country to the ILO, hence the maximum number
of conventions from the sample which can be ratified by a country may vary.
In the denominator, we have the probability that any of the I countries ratifies a
convention from its risk set. One immediately observes that the regression
constant and the baseline hazard λ0(t) cancel out from this formulation. The fact
that the baseline hazard does not have to be specified parametrically makes the
partial likelihood approach a very flexible estimation technique.
To find the partial likelihood function of the whole sample, the
contributions from all ratifications are formed in an analogous way, and the
product of them is taken:
∏ ∏
γ
γ
=
= =
= ∈
I
i
J
j I
k Rl
ij
kl
ij
ij
i
k
ij
tz
tz
L
1 1
1
])'(exp[
])'(exp[
.   (2)
This partial likelihood function is maximised with respect to the
parameter vector γ. Right-censored spells, i.e. non-ratification of conventions at
the end of the observation period, can easily be accommodated by the partial
likelihood technique by excluding them from the risk set at the time of censoring
(see Lancaster, 1990: 250ff.).
The fixed effects estimator
The Cox partial likelihood estimator derived this far treats all observations as
independent. However, it is very likely that country-specific effects are present
in our data. From the Kaplan-Meier estimates, we observe that the shapes of the
empirical hazard rates differ widely between industrialised and developing
countries, and these groups are in themselves very heterogenous. A certain
amount of this heterogeneity is probably not captured by the observed
covariates, e.g., certain properties of the labour law which make it difficult to
implement international labour conventions, the system of social security, or the
wage bargaining system.
Since these factors are likely not to vary much over time, we estimate a
model with a fixed country-specific effect. The proportional hazard then
becomes:
])'(exp[)()( 0 γµλ=λ tztt ijiij
with iµ  a factor which is constant over time and specific to each country. In this
case, the partial likelihood is given as
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As long as the µ’s are not equal for all countries, they do not cancel out
from the partial likelihood function (unlike the constant and the baseline
hazard). In our estimator, we treat the µ’s as fixed parameters and maximise the
partial likelihood function (3) with respect to them and to the parameters γ.29
The stratified Cox estimator
The underlying assumption of the fixed-effects estimator is that, conditionally
on the country fixed effects and the observed independent variables, all
durations are independent. The baseline hazard λ0(t) is shifted up and down
according to the fixed effects estimate. This means that the country-specific
effect is assumed to be the same both over all conventions as well as over the
whole time after the adoption of a convention.
Our third estimator is more general by allowing each country to have a
separate baseline hazard λi0(t). Allowing for country-specific duration
dependence is important if some countries are predisposed to ratify conventions
earlier or later than others. Characteristics of the legal process and the political
                                          
29 The µ’s could also be treated as random effects. For a random effects proportional
hazards model, see Guo and Rodriguez (1992).
system are examples for variables that come to mind in this context. The
complete hazard rate is in this case
])'(exp[)()( 0 γλ=λ tztt ijiij
Note that, compared to the fixed effects estimator (3), the  µi are absorbed in the
)(0 tiλ .
The principle of the stratified partial likelihood estimator is to decompose
the total likelihood into several sub-likelihoods specific to each stratum
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980: 87f.; Lancaster, 1990: 268ff.). Each
contribution to a sub-likelihood gives the probability of ratification of
convention j by country i at time ijt , conditional on the fact that country i
ratified any convention at time ijt . We write 
i
jt instead of t
ij to indicate each of
the the Ji failure times of country i, as opposed to the i
iJ failure times of the
whole sample.
The country-specific sub-likelihoods are then given as
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The risk set ijR  comprises the conventions not yet ratified by country i at
the time ijt , i.e. before country i’s ratification of convention j. It is evident that
the country-specific baseline hazard cancels out from the sub-likelihood. Taking
the product over all countries, one obtains the likelihood of the whole sample:
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Unlike the country-specific time-dependence function, the covariates are
assumed to influence the hazard rate in the same way in each country, hence
there is only one coefficient vector which is obtained by maximising the
function (4) with respect to γ.
The stratification of the likelihood function is computationally
inexpensive and does not result in huge efficiency losses if it is done
unnecessarily (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980: 88). A possible drawback of the
procedure is that only coefficients of variables that vary over the  Ji ratification
spells of each country are identified from the data. If the covariates were
constant over time, this would mean that one could use only convention-specific
variables but no country-specific variables. If, however, covariates which are
country-specific but not convention-specific can vary over time, they take
different values at the different durations ijt  for each ratification spell unless the
conventions are adopted (i.e., ratification spells start) at the same calendar date.
In our data set, there are adoptions over the whole period from 1975 to 1995.
Given sufficient variation in the independent variables over time, the
coefficients of variables which are country-specific but not convention-specific
should thus be identified.
6 Empirical Results
In this section, we present estimation results for the partial likelihood functions
(2) to (4). As mentioned previously, all estimations are performed separately for
country groups. Table 5 presents results for industrialised countries, while the
results for developing countries are displayed in table 6.
For industrialised countries, the only unambiguous finding concerning the
cost variables is that countries which have ratified the predecessor convention (if
such a convention exists) are significantly more likely to also ratify the revising
convention. If, by contrast, a country did not ratify the predecessor convention,
ratification is less likely than in cases where a predecessor convention did not
exist. The first of these findings is more robust than the second. The estimated
coefficients suggest that the degree to which pre-existing legislation would have
to be changed in order to conform with the convention matters for the
ratification decision. By contrast, the GDP terms become insignificant once
Table 5. Ratification of ILO Conventions, 1975-95, industrialised countries
Standard Cox Fixed Effects Stratified
Variable Coeff. Std.Dev. Coeff. Std.Dev. Coeff. Std.Dev.
Cost variables
Real GDP per capita -0.387 0.166 0.050 0.336 -0.318 0.391
Real GDP p.c., squared 0.016 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.022 0.015
Population (millions) -0.009 0.003 0.149 0.068 0.051 0.077
Predecessor
convention, dummy
-0.525 0.338 -0.857 0.389 -0.655 0.378
Ratification of
predecessor, dummy
0.946 0.369 1.198 0.419 0.899 0.413
Internal pressure variables
Left majority in
Parliament, dummy
0.702 0.174 0.578 0.215 0.265 0.234
Union: yes 1.426 0.803 1.523 0.832 1.434 0.819
Employers: yes 0.733 0.592 0.504 0.616 0.700 0.624
Employers: no 0.904 0.569 0.739 0.601 0.759 0.613
Gov’t: yes -1.606 0.935 -2.321 1.065 -2.142 1.021
ILC
voting
Gov’t: no -3.114 1.109 -3.689 1.236 -3.593 1.194
External pressure variable
Openness -0.010 0.003 0.044 0.016 0.047 0.019
Other variables
Subject dummies YES YES YES
Country fixed effects NO YES YES
Time trend -0.058 0.023 -0.155 0.037 -0.138 0.039
Number of observations 5678 5678 5678
Observation units
(Countries x Conv.)
636 636 636
Number of ratifications 183 183 183
Log likelihood initial -1093.5 -1093.5 -509.9
Log likelihood final -1013.8 -889.0 -438.9
Note: Coefficients which are significant at the 5 per cent level (t-test) printed in bold type.
country-specific heterogeneity is controlled for. Population (as a proxy for
administrative cost per capita) has a significantly positive sign only in the fixed
effects specification.
Turning to the coefficients on the internal pressure variables, the
coefficient on the political party variable has the expected sign and is highly
significant in the standard Cox as well as the fixed effects specifications, but
takes a much lower value and loses its significance once country-specific
baseline hazards are allowed for. The variable which captures trade unions’
preferences, voting in favour of the convention at the International Labour
Conference, takes a positive coefficient which is robust across estimations and is
in each case significant at the ten per cent level. This can be taken as evidence
that unions exert pressure for the ratification of conventions of which they
approve.30 By contrast, employer delegates’ voting behaviour seems unrelated to
the ratification decision. A government vote against the convention significantly
decreases the likelihood of ratification. Surprisingly, votes in favour of the
convention are also correlated with a lower ratification hazard as compared to
abstentions. This result can be explained by the fact that almost all government
abstentions in the subsample of industrialised countries concern Iceland or the
United States. Iceland did not send delegates to the Conference until the 1980s,
and for U.S. delegates, abstentions are mainly recorded as a consequence of the
temporary cessation of ILO membership. Both kinds of abstentions should not
be interpreted as measuring the preferences concerning a particular convention.
The coefficient for the openness variable takes a negative sign (consistent
with the costs hypothesis) in standard Cox estimation but becomes positive once
the cross-country variation is eliminated. This could mean that countries, as they
open up their markets, become more concerned about their reputation
                                          
30 Since the base category is trade union abstention over the convention, an alternative
explanation could be that this variable measures trade union strength. Weak unions
concerning labour standards. It could also be interpreted as evidence in favour of
Rodrik’s (1998) hypothesis that the opening of trade creates additional income
risks and thus raises the demand for social spending and protective legislation.
Obviously, the openness variable interacts with total population, which also
changes its sign in the estimations which take account of country-specific
heterogeneity.
An interesting result is that the propensity to ratify conventions is
significantly declining over time in the group of industrialised countries.
Overall, we note a slight loss of efficiency in the stratified compared to the two
unstratified estimations.
In contrast to the results for the industrialised countries, we do find a
significant and positive impact of per capita income on the ratification
probability for developing countries. With increasing levels of income, however,
the effect becomes smaller, as the negative sign for the squared term indicates.31
As in the industrialised sample, there is a highly significant impact of the
ratification of a “predecessor” convention. In magnitude, the effect is even
larger than among developed countries. We conclude that the impact of
economic costs on the ratification of ILO conventions is stronger for developing
than for industrialised countries. This view is reinforced by the sign of the
openness variable, which is, unlike in the industrialised subsample, consistent
with the cost hypothesis.
The variables relating to internal political actors are all insignificant in the
subsample of developing countries. In the case of left party control of
parliament, this might perhaps be due to problems of classification. More
interesting is the fact that none of the voting variables is in any way related to
                                                                                                                                   
may lack the resources to send delegates to the Conference, and at the same time
cannot exert sufficient domestic pressure for ratification.
31 In all three estimations, the maximum of the polynomial lies between 6,000 to
7,000 US-$. The income terms are jointly significant at the five per cent level in the
standard Cox and fixed effects models.
Table 6. Ratification of ILO Conventions, 1975-95, developing countries
Standard Cox Fixed Effects Stratified
Variable Coeff. Std.Dev. Coeff. Std.Dev. Coeff. Std.Dev.
Cost variables
Real GDP per capita 0.672 0.157 2.091 0.653 1.482 0.731
Real GDP p.c., squared -0.049 0.018 -0.166 0.058 -0.119 0.065
Population (millions) 0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.006 0.000 0.006
Predecessor
convention, dummy
-0.777 0.288 -0.738 0.291 -0.713 0.293
Ratification of
predecessor, dummy
1.368 0.351 1.256 0.368 1.091 0.378
Internal pressure variables
Democracy, Dummy 0.192 0.160 0.049 0.289 -0.166 0.361
Left majority in
Parliament, dummy
-0.376 0.308 -0.552 0.373 -0.334 0.392
Union: yes 0.124 0.169 0.075 0.186 -0.100 0.191
Employers: yes -0.199 0.174 -0.215 0.210 -0.158 0.208
Employers: no -0.319 0.235 -0.295 0.262 -0.132 0.264
Gov’t: yes 0.070 0.209 -0.024 0.231 -0.046 0.241
ILC
voting
Gov’t: no 0.233 0.291 0.113 0.311 -0.087 0.322
External pressure variables
Development aid -0.008 0.013 0.002 0.018 0.012 0.018
World Bank loans 0.065 0.039 -0.033 0.068 -0.132 0.088
IMF credits 0.095 0.043 0.158 0.095 0.107 0.117
Openness -0.012 0.002 -0.014 0.007 -0.015 0.008
Other variables
Subject dummies YES YES YES
Country fixed effects NO YES YES
Time trend -0.005 0.022 0.001 0.025 0.023 0.027
Number of observations 24412 24412 24412
Observation units 2322 2322 2322
Number of ratifications 231 231 231
Log likelihood initial -1637.2 -1637.2 -623.7
Log likelihood final -1530.1 -1423.5 -570.0
Note: Coefficients which are significant at the 5 per cent level (t-test) printed in bold type.
the ratification hazard. There are two potential explanations which can be given
to this finding. First, political constellations may change more frequently in
developing countries. A government or union leadership that voted in favour of
a convention may be succeeded by another which takes a different stance.  A
second explanation could be that Conference delegates from developing
countries do not base their voting decisions on their true preference. Instead, by
voting in favour of a convention they want to be seen as cooperating in this
political forum. This view is given support by the fact that government delegates
sometimes vote in favour while at the same time officially stating that their
country is not in a position to ratify the convention.
Most of the other variables have insignificant coefficients. Among the
external pressure variables, there is a positive sign for the amount of IMF credits
received by a country, but it loses its significance in the fixed effects and
stratified estimations. It appears that countries which are dependent on foreign
aid or credits do not feel compelled to show their acceptance of international
labour standards. Unlike among industrialised countries, the propensity to ratify
conventions has not declined over time in the developing countries subsample.
Table 7 shows the quantitative effects of the independent variables. It
displays the hazard ratio which gives the effect of a unit change in any of the
covariates.32 Apart from GDP and population, the independent variables are
either dummy variables or are measured in percentage points, hence the numbers
can easily be interpreted. The ratification of a predecessor convention has a
large effect on the ratification hazard of the revising convention: among
developing countries, the predicted hazard is almost three times higher. Among
the political variables, the largest effect is produced by union voting behaviour.
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hence the hazard ratios are simply the exponentiated coefficients.
Table 7. Effect on the hazard rate of a unit change
 in the independent variable
Independent variable Industrialised
countries
Developing
countries
Population (millions) 1.05 1.00
Predecessor convention, dummy 0.52 0.49
Ratification of predecessor, dummy 2.45 2.98
Democracy, dummy  – 0.85
Left majority in Parliament, dummy 1.30 0.72
Union: yes 4.19 0.90
Employers: yes 2.14 0.85
Employers: no 2.01 0.88
Gov’t: yes 0.12 0.95
ILC voting
dummies
Gov’t: no 0.03 0.92
Development aid (per cent of GDP)  – 1.01
World Bank loans (per cent of GDP)  – 0.88
IMF credits (per cent of GDP)  – 1.11
Openness (per cent of GDP) 1.05 0.98
Year 0.87 1.02
Note: Results are based on the stratified estimator
The quantitative effects of the loans and credits variables may appear to
be large (an increase or decrease in the hazard of 11 to 12 percent for each one
percentage point change in these variables), but one has to take into account that
a change of one percentage point in World Bank loans or IMF credits relative to
GDP is a very large change.
The decline over time in the ratification hazard among industrialised
countries seems to be fairly dramatic: each year, the hazard falls by 13 per cent.
Apparently, the model attributes the decline found in the empirical hazard
mostly to the lower ratification probabilities in later (calendar) years.
The three different specifications used are nested, with the standard Cox
estimator being the most restrictive and the stratified estimator the least
restrictive approach. Different statistical tests can be performed to check which
of these specifications is most appropriate.
Consider first the fixed effects versus the standard Cox estimator.
Likelihood ratio tests showed that the country dummies were jointly significant
in both the industrialised and the developing subsamples, with tests statistics of
249.59 in the first group and 213.33 in the second.33
Next, we performed a Hausman test of the stratified versus the standard
Cox estimator, as proposed by Ridder and Tunalı (1999). This test rejected the
unstratified estimator in the industrialised countries subsample, but failed to
reject it for developing countries. The test statistics were 32.95 with 21 degrees
of freedom for industrialised countries, which is just significant at the five per
level, and 12.85 with 25 degrees of freedom for developing countries. However,
the last result could well be due to the large number of insignificant regressors in
the latter estimations, which negatively affects the power of the test.
To evaluate all three estimators individually, Table 8 contains results for
the test of the proportional hazard assumption proposed by Grambsch and
Therneau (1994), based on the residuals calculated from the Cox regressions.
The test statistic is distributed as a 2χ  random variate, with the degrees of
freedom equal to the number of estimated coefficients. As can be seen, the
proportional hazards assumption is rejected for both unstratified estimators in
the industrialised countries subsample and for the standard Cox estimator for
developing countries. Taken together, the test results reinforce our a priori belief
that it is important to control for country-specific heterogeneity in the
estimations.
                                          
33 Critical values at five per cent significance are 31.41 and 76.77, for 20 and 58
degrees of freedom, respectively. Note that several country dummies were dropped
due to collinearity.
Table 8. Tests of proportional hazards assumption
SpecificationCountry
group Standard Fixed Effects Stratified
Industrialised
countries
45.02
(21)
74.99
(43)
17.10
(21)
Developing
countries
39.13
(25)
134.89
(111)
27.09
(25)
Note: Test statistics which reject the null hypothesis of the
proportional hazard assumption at the 5 per cent significance
level are printed in bold type. Numbers in parentheses
are degrees of freedom.
Conclusions
In duration data analysis, economic development has been found to be one of the
principal reasons which affect the ratification of ILO conventions. In more
highly developed countries, ratification occurs much more frequently,
presumably because these countries do already possess a large inventory of
labour regulations and social standards. This finding stands in marked contrast
to statistical results by Haas (1962) for earlier periods, who found that
industrialised countries did not ratify conventions much more frequently than
others. The impact of pre-existing legislation is also visible in the increased
likelihood of ratification if the country had already ratified a previous
convention on the same subject.
Among developing countries, variables relating to the economic costs of
ratification are the only ones which significantly affect the ratification
probability. Their influence is much more visible here than for the subsample of
developed countries.
For industrialised countries, some political variables are found to have an
impact on the probability of ratification. As a measure of union preferences, the
voting behaviour of the trade union delegate at the International Labour
Conference is quantitatively the most important one. Another factor – significant
in two out of three specifications – is the ideology of the parliamentarian
majority. The significance of these variables suggests that in industrialised
countries, ILO conventions are used as a vehicle for political change by
domestic political actors. This could explain why, in the study by  Strang and
Chang (1993), ILO conventions are found to impact on social spending only in
industrialised but not in developing countries.
An issue we have not addressed is whether countries influence each other
in the ratification decision. In this paper, we have assumed that each ratification
occurs conditionally independent of the ratifications by other countries.
However, it seems plausible that the pressure to ratify rises, and economic costs
of ratification decline, with the number of countries which have already bound
themselves to the convention. This question needs to be addressed in further
research.
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